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Articles
Herbert Wechsler*

Revision and Codification
of Penal Law in the
United States

I am honored by the invitation to address you and happy to join in.
your tribute to the memory of Horace Read.
Dean Read was a pioneer in the perception that this isd legislative
age, one of the greatest legislative eras of all time. He was concerned
that lawyers be equipped to deal effectively with the ever growing
corpus of the statutory law and he made valuable contributions to
that end. Whether the larger legislative role in the development of law
that he depicted and foresaw was a phenomenon that he regarded
with approval or regret, I must confess I do not know. But speaking
for myself, I do not hesitate to say that I regard it-and I have
regarded it for almost halfa century-as essential to maintain a living
law.
Courts have, to be sure, an important role to play in the refreshment and refurbishing of legal norms, and I do not depreciate their
contributions. But judicial capacity and function do not extend to the
critical, creative reexamination and rethinking that our law so badly
needs in many fields. Law must be regarded for this purpose through
legislative rather than judicial eyes, for only at the legislative level is it
possible, as Justice Roger J. Traynor of California put it long ago, "to
write on a clean slate, in terms of policy transcending case or controversy, and to erase and rewrite in response to community needs."'
You in Canada surely have endorsed this point ofview as the Law
Commission concept has now taken hold both nationally and provincially. We in the United States agree increasingly in principle,
though we are not disposed to place reliance on a single public agency
but rather on a plurality of centers of initiative-private as well as
governmental-to carry on what is assuredly an endless task. The
progress we have made leaves much to be desired but there have been
*Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law Emeritus itt Columbia University,
Director of the American Law Institute, formerly Chief Reporter for the Model Penal
Code. The seventh Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture delivered at Dalhousie law
School on October 29, 1981.

1. "Comment on Courts and Lawmaking" in Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow
(Paulsen ed. 1959) at 50.
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significant achievements. I place in this category the revision and
codification of the penal law in many of our jurisdictions.
I
In the United States, as in Canada, criminal law began with the
reception of the English common law and antecedent legislation, plus
a small addendum of colonial enactments. It was an obscure system,
if indeed it may be called a system, fraught with technicalities and
bloody in the punishments that it endeavored to impose on the
unfortunates within its toils. Livingston and others made a valiant
effort to refurbish this inheritance but on the whole their efforts were
abortive. Legislation did reduce the number of the capital offenses
but generally went no further than to fix the lesser penalties to be
imposed. If it undertook a definition of offenses, the text was very
likely to be drawn from Blackstone's repetition of judicial formula1iorns. Principles, rules and doctrines measuing the scopt of YlabVlt-y
and of defenses were dealt with very rarely in the statutes and
remitted consequently to the common law.
The first protest against this state of things to bear substantial fruit
was that of David Dudley Field. His crusade for written law produced results in New York State, including a penal code proposed in
1865 and enacted in 1882. The draft was copied in a number of our
western states, including California, where codification was a popular program a century ago. The Code was, however, a minor
achievement, for Field was not at home in penal law and neither he
nor his colleagues were disposed to confront its basic problems.
Hence, their draft purpGrted onty to comtpile and argatize e'xiting
statutes, with minor additions thought-sometimes erroneously-to
restate the common law. Even the systematic arrangement that the
Code developed was abandoned in New York in later years in favor
of an alphabetical sequence, totally obscuring any sense of function
or relation in the statutory norms.
The result, as I appraised the situation thirty years ago,2 was that,
notwithstanding the importance of the penal law to society and to the
individual, we did not have an integrated, reasoned corpusjurisin
this field. Such statutes as we had were fragmentary, old, disorganized and even accidental in their coverage, far more important in their
gloss than in their text, producing a medley of enactment and of
common law that only local history explained. Basic doctrines
governing the scope and measure of the liability had received scant
2. See "The Challenge of a Model Penal Code" (1952), 65 Harv.L Rev. 1097.
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attention from the legislature; and discriminations that distinguished
minor crime from major criminality, or otherwise had large significance for the offender's treatment, rested all too often upon factors
unrelated to the ends that law should serve.
The growth of the law had been, moreover, very largely fortuitous:
the statutes of an older state simply transplanted to a younger, as
from Georgia to Illinois or New York to the Dakotas; accretions
formulated on an ad hoc basis by a multitude of most particular
enactments, often inconsistent or redundant, responding to the pressures and excitement that arose from time to time; systematic inventories of the total system rarely made and if made totally abortive, as
in Illinois in 1935. In the first half of this century, the only one of our
jurisdictions that produced a reexamination and revision of its penal
law was Louisiana in the Code of 1942, a project with immediate
practical objectives that forced a limited conception of the goal to be
achieved.
Moved by considerations of the sort I have set forth, the American
Law Institute (a private organization of judges, lawyers and law
teachers devoted to the clarification and improvement of the law)
undertook, with the generous financial support of the Rockefeller
Foundation, to formulate and draft what we boldly called a Model
Penal Code. The method of procedure, as in all the projects of the
Institute, was to designate reporters whose submissions were
reviewed by an eclectic body of Advisers and thereafter by the
Council of the Institute and by the Institute itself in its annual
meetings. In nine successive years the Institute considered a succession of printed drafts presenting formulations covering different
aspects of the Code, with a complete official draft considered and
approved in 1962.
The hope that animated this substantial undertaking was not to
achieve uniformity in penal law throughout the country, where, as
you know, criminal legislation is primarily a state and not a national
responsibility, reversing the Canadian position. The goal was rather
to facilitate and stimulate the systematic reappraisal of existing
systems, based upon a fresh consideration of the problems they must
face and of their possible solutions. It was a hope that has been
realized beyond our fondest expectations.
Revision work was started in a number of the states even as the
Institute began its work, producing new codes in Wisconsin effective
in 1956; Illinois in 1962; Minnesota and New Mexico in 1963; New
York in 1967; Georgia in 1969; Kansas in 1970; Connecticut in 1971;
Colorado and Oregon in 1972; Delaware, Hawaii, New Hampshire,

222 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Pennsylvania and Utah in 1973; Ohio, Montana and Texas in 1974;
Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota and Virginia in 1975; Arkansas,
Maine and Washington in 1976; South Dakota and Indiana in 1977;
Arizona and Iowa in 1978; Missouri, Nebraska and New Jersey in
1979; and Alabama and Alaska in 1990. Of these 34 enactments it is
fair to say that 33 (excluding only Wisconsin) were in some part
influenced by the positions taken in the Model Code, though the
extent to which particular formulations or approaches of the Model
were adopted varied extensively from state to state. Georgia, Kansas,
Minnesota, New Mexico and Virginia, for example, were content
with much less ambitious efforts in their revisions than Delaware,
Hawaii, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Oregon
and Utah. What is important is, however, that the legislative process
has at long last made a major effort to appraise the content of the
penal law by a contemporary reasoned judgment -the prohibitions
it lays down, the excuses it admits, the sanctions it employs, and the
range of the authority that it distributes and confers.
Nor is the process over yet. Draft codes prepared in jurisdictions
where enactment failed, notably California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Vermont, may still be revived
(though not I suppose in Idaho where the model was enacted effective January 1, 1972, but promptly repealed as of the following April
1, in response to the objection of the prosecutors). There are also
pending bills in West Virginia and Wyoming that may pass.3 Congress, moreover, has been working a full decade on the drafting of an
integrated code of our federal criminal law, based on the 1971 report
of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.
Many bills have been prepared and hearings held; and there may still
4
be motion on the project.
Finally, I should note that quite apart from the general revisions I
have mentioned, there was much reliance on the Model Code in
legislation addressed to specific problems, such as jurisdiction, double jeopardy, responsibility, attempts, theft, abortion, obscenity and
capital punishment. There has also been a gratifying use of the
material by courts as an interpretative aid and in restating or reshaping areas of the unwritten law. From July 1959 to April 1, 1981, drafts
of the Model, tentative or final, were cited by our appellate courts in
1339 cases, 134 of them in Pennsylvania, 89 in New York, 86 in
Massachusetts and 58 in the Supreme Court of the United States.
3. The Wyoming Code has now been enacted, effective July 1, 1983.
4. 1 have added as an Appendix a chart describing the current status of criminal code
revision in the jursidictions of the United States. See infra at 233-235.
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Such is the magnitude of the legislative development in penal law
that I wished to call to your attention. It is a movement that developed strength without a pre-commitment to particular reforms, its
impetus essentially a moral sentiment: the need for reassurance that
when so much is at stake for the community and for the individual,
care has been taken to make law as rational and just as law can be.
Would I be wrong in thinking that this is essentially the sentiment
that animates the approach of your national Law Reform Commission to the revision of the Criminal Code, as expressed, for example,
in its 1977 report (Our Criminal Law), which I regard as a distinguished document?
That our development was greatly facilitated by the Model Penal
Code and its availability as a point of departure for revision work is
not only my own opinion; that influence has been attested by the
scholars and, indeed, by the revisers themselves. The Model Code,
however, did not stand alone. The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, prepared
during the years from 1964 to 1973 (and since republished in a revised
edition), the 1967 report of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice (The Challenge of Crime in a FreeSociety), the support in a later administration of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, the establishment by Congress of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration and its willingness to provide substantial grants in aid for penal law revision-yielded in
combination supporting stimuli of great significance. Moreover,
once the Illinois and New York codes had been enacted in 1961 and
1965, they functioned most effectively as models for the work in other
jurisdictions, mitigating the political hazard of reliance on a source
that might be denigrated as theoretical or academic. As the process
advanced from year to year, traditional habits of legislative imitation
were thus accorded ever wider scope, facilitating new enactments.
II
I come now to the hardest portion of my task, to give some indication
of the content of the codes and of the progress I believe they have
achieved. Their variations in the treatment of specific subjects,
not to speak of the details of legislative language, are, of course,
too numerous to canvass in a lecture. That they merit more attention than they thus far have received from legal scholars is quite
clearly indicated by the three-volume study our Institute has published on the definitions of specific crimes (Model Penal Code and
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Commentaries, Part II, 1980) and will be demonstrated further by
forthcoming volumes on Part I, the general provisions. I shall
attempt no more than to describe some of the common characteristics of the codes, adding as time permits selected illustrations of their
treatment of important problems. 5
Following the example of the Model Penal Code, the new codes
are organized in general and special parts, with the general much
more extensive in its treatment of pervasive problems than was
heretofore the case in our tradition, and the special, embodying the
definitions and gradations of specific crimes, organized functionally
in terms of the interests sought to be protected or the evils sought to
be averted by the penal law.
In the Model Code the general provisions begin with a preliminary
article addressed to purposes and principles of construction, territorial applicability, the classification of offenses, time limitations, multiple prosecutions and double jeopardy, the burden of proof and
presumptions. Article 2 attempts to formulate general principles of
liability and exculpation, including the modes of culpability, with
emphasis upon the mental element; causality; strict liability; complicity; the criminal liability of corporations and associations and of
persons acting or responsible for acting on their behalf; the defensive
significance of mistake, intoxication, duress, consent, military orders
and entrapment. Article 3 deals with the general principles ofjustification for conduct that would otherwise be criminal, including broad
provisions on the choice of evils and privileged instrusions upon
property and narrower provisions on the use of force in selfprotection, the protection of other persons and of property, in crime
prevention, law enforcement and the discharge of various responsibilities for care, discipline and safety. Article 4 is addressed to the
significance of mental disease or defect and immaturity in excluding
criminal responsibility, along with the procedural problems presented when such issues have been raised. Article 5 deals with inchoate
crimes: attempts, solicitation and conspiracy and the prohibited
possession of offensive weapons or the instruments of crime. Article 6
delineates the authorized methods of disposing of offenders on conviction, including fines, suspension of sentence, probation and imprisonment, fixing the limits of all prison sentences for the several grades
and degrees of offenses that the code employs. Article 7, finally, sets
5. For earlier but somewhat more extensive descriptions, see, e.g., Wechsler, "Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code" (1968), 68 Colum. L
Rev. 1425, "The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Criminal Law" in
Crime, Criminology and Public Policy (R. Hood ed. 1974) at 419.
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forth criteria for withholding sentence of imprisonment, placing the
defendant on probation, imposing fines, ordering imprisonment for
an extended term, and multiple sentences for multiple offenses. It
also deals with many aspects of sentencing procedure.
Part II of the Model contains the definitions of specific crimes. It
does not purport to be exhaustive but there is a full treatment of
crimes involving danger to the person, such as homicide, assault,
reckless endangering, threats, kidnapping, false imprisonment and
criminal coercion; the sexual offenses; the major offenses against
property, including arson, criminal mischief, burglary, robbery,
theft, forgery and fraudulent practices; offenses against the family,
such as bigamy, incest, abortion, endangering child welfare and
persistent non-support; offenses against public administration,
including bribery and corrupt influence, perjury and other falsifications, obstructions of governmental operations and abuse of office.
Lastly, offenses against public order and decency, like riot, disorderly
conduct, public drunkenness, crimes of desecration and the violation
of privacy, as well as lewdness, prostitution and obscenity are dealt
6
with in detail.
The codes reflect to a remarkable degree these concepts of organization and coverage, with the result that there is now in place an
elaborate set of general provisions, formulating elements of liability
and grounds of exculpation deemed to qualify or supplement the
definition of specific crimes, save as exceptions may be made on
special grounds; and there is a full legislative treatment of the definitions and gradations of the common crimes.
Not all the codes, I hasten to make clear, address all the problems
dealt with in the Model but most of them, I think it fair to say,
confront most of the issues that the Model undertook to draw. This
works a quite dramatic change, I hardly need to say, in the content of
our statutory law.
'III
Passing beyond these general descriptions, I wish, before concluding,
to present the substance of some common features of the codes
involving major substantive improvements, drawing examples from
both general and special parts, within the limits of my time.

6. Parts III and IV of the Model Code dealing with correctional matters and the
organization of a Department of Correction address problems that are not upon the
whole treated in the new codes and I, therefore, pass their content by in this discussion.
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1. Mens Rea and the Modes of Culpability.
It is, I think, the general opinion that the most dramatic breakthrough in the general provisions inheres in the widespread acceptance of the treatment of mens rea in Article 2 of the Model Code.
This analysis begins by classifying the material objective elements
of crimes as involving either the nature of the actor's conduct (shooting a gun, driving a car, writing a check) or the attendant circumstances (a crowded street, a drunken driver, an empty bank account) or a
result of conduct (causing death, injury, deception or financial loss).
The problem of the mental element arises obviously with respect to
each of the objective elements that give the actor's conduct its offensive quality and are included for that reason in the definition of the
crime or that negate an excuse or justification that would otherwise
obtain.
After declaring that "a person is not guilty of an offense unless his
liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable," the
Code defines the further elements of culpability in terms of only four
familiar concepts: purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence.
The minimal statement is that one may not be convicted of a crime
"unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as
the law may require, with respect to each material element of the
offense." This formulation recognizes that the required mode of
culpability may not only vary from crime to crime but also from one
to another material element of the same offense, meaning by material
elerm'ent, you will recall, those aspects of conduct, attendant circumstances or result that give behavior its offensive quality. Inhomicid e,
for example, the law may require proof that the defendant killed
purposely or knowingly to establish that a murder was committed.
But if self-defense is claimed in exculpation, it may suffice to negative
the defense that the actor's belief in his peril did not rest on reasonable
grounds. When and if that is so, negligence is all the law requires with
respect to the existence of attendant circumstances precluding the
defense-which in this context it is useful to treat as an element of the
offense.
One of the virtues of this method of analysis is that it invites
attention to the wisdom of such stark distinctions as to culpability
yespte-ig diffetetnt tl Mtextz of an offtnst. Tht 03&e nakes %'Z
attempt to promote uniformity upon this issue by providing that
when "the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability
that is sufficient for" its commission "without distinguishing among
the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the
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material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly
appears." It also states what we believed to be the common law
position that when "the culpability sufficient to establish a material
element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is
established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with
respect thereto." The legislature in defining crimes may thus draw
such distinctions among offenses or the elements thereof as it deems
wise, but if it fails to articulate decisions of this kind, the Code
prescribes the norms that shall prevail.
The basic culpability conceptions are defined. The distinction
between acting purposely and knowingly is very narrow, since
awareness that the requisite external circumstances exist is a common element. But action is not deemed purposive with respect to the
nature or results of an actor's conduct, unless "it was his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result."
Though acting knowingly suffices to establish liability for most
offenses, there are situations where the law requires purpose, such as
treason, complicity, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy, to cite but
few examples. Purpose is, moreover, frequently employed in determining the gravity of crimes for purposes of sentence.
Recklessness, as the Model Code defines the term, involves conscious risk creation. It resembles acting knowingly in that a state of
awareness is involved but the awareness is of risk, short of practical
certainty with respect to a result or deliberate blindness to a high
probability with respect to the existence of a fact. The risk consciously disregarded must be "substantiar' and must, moreover, be
"unjustifiable", since even substantial risks often may be taken properly, depending on their nature and the character and purpose of the
conduct. A surgeon may perform an operation though he knows it
very likely to be fatal, if he thinks that it affords the patient's only
chance. The ultimate question put, when all is weighed, is whether the
actor's disregard of the known risk "involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor's situation." That is a standard that can be given further
content only in its application to a concrete case.
Negligence is distinguished from acting purposely, knowingly or
recklessly in that it does not involve a state of awareness. It is the case
where the actor "should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that a material element [of an offense] exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
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deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation." Gross deviation is again the ultimate
standard that can gain further content only in its application to a
concrete case. Much more than the "ordinary negligence" of tort law
Emn so, th Mdod, az fts =%ig== as
is, of vouts, i,,61,,4.
sufficient for liability only in exceptional cases where maximum
preventive effort is essential, as in homicide or causing bodily iijury,
or where it alleviates strict liability or otherwise effects a mitigation in
the rigor of the antecedent law.
As I reflect upon this recitation, I am appalled, as you must be, by
its inordinate abstraction. I say, however, in defense that compared
to the judicial exegesis of mens rea that these formulations were
intended to supplant, with its plethora of words and phrases of the
most uncertain meaning-the Code concepts are a model of clarity
and of precision. Their adoption now with only minor verbal variations in the penal codes of half of our states and their inclusion in all
of the federal proposals provide assurance that they have not been
too abstruse for sympathetic legislative comprehension, that, indeed,
they present a viable statutory treatment of this ancient and elusive
problem.
2. Strict Liability.
The emphasis on culpability does not, of course, preclude the legislature from insisting on strict liability in given areas, as there is a strong
tendency to do with respect to such matters, for example, as mistake
respecting the age of the victim when that is material in a sexual
w zadtes ha' ez
zffens. It can be se~id, in genzval, hzw'-Ne, ,h+th t
responded to the efforts in the Model to cut down upon such areas.
They have unhappily been less responsive to the frontal attack that
the Model mounted on strict liability in regulatory statutes located
outside the penal code but employing penal sanctions.
The Code proposal is, in substance, that unless negligence at least
is proved, a violation of the statute may be dealt with only by a fine or
civil penalty or forfeiture, not by a sentence of probation or imprisonment; and the conviction does not constitute a crime. The result
would be quite similar to that favored by the Canadian Law Reform
Commission in recommending that "every offence outside the Criminal Code admits of a defence of due diligence" (Our CriminalLaw,
at 32-33), except that the burden of persuasion would not necessarily
be shifted to the defendant. No more than a handful of the codes have
thus far accepted this solution. Most go no further than to provide, as
New York does, that a "statute defining a crime, unless clearly
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indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability" shall "be
construed as defining a crime of mental culpability." 7 This is a
declaration that could have a large effect, however, since statutes of
this kind are typically silent with respect to any culpability requirement, simply condemning doing or not doing this or that. I see signs
in our decisions now that judicial hospitality to strict liability is very
much on the decline. With deregulation on the rise, legislative hospitality may be declining too.
It is surely not a subtle point to insist that the law of crime cannot
be insulated from the demands of justice with respect to allocating
blame and punishment. The court that pronounces a conviction must
be able to declare that the defendant acted wrongly in the conduct
held to constitute a crime. This is a matter of intrinsic fairness to the
person who is judged, but it is more than that as well. The law
promotes the general security by building confidence that those
whose conduct does not warrant condemnation, those who seek and
take care to live within the law, will not be condemned as criminal.
This is a value of enormous moment in a free society. It is intrinsic to
the sense ofjustice that alone gives moral force to the proscriptions of
the penal law.
3. Other General Provisions Relevant to Culpability.
The point of view I have expressed animates other general provisions
of the codes that time does not permit me to discuss. I have in mind
especially the widespread recognition of a defense based upon reasonable reliance on official statements of the law; the general insistence
upon purpose as the mode of culpability in complicity rather than an
objective test of probability; the mitigation of corporate liability
when neither the board of directors nor a high managerial agent is
involved in the commission of the offense; the extension of the
defense of duress to all offenses, measured by whether "a person of
reasonable firmness" in the actor's situation "would have been unable
to resist" the pressure; the articulation of a general defense of
entrapment; the introduction in some of the codes of a broad justification based on a necessary choice of evils, coupled in some jurisdictions with insistence that belief in the existence of justifying circumstances should suffice to exculpate, unless the belief is recklessly or
negligently formed and recklessness or negligence, as the case may be,
establishes the culpability required for commission of the offense
charged; the effort to impose reasonable limits on the use of deadly
7. N.Y. Penal Law 15.15 (2).
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force in law enforcement, especially to effect an arrest; the reformulation in more than lialf our jurisdictions of the criterion determining
the significance of mental disease or defect as a ground of exculpation
(in terms of lack of 'substantial capacity" to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of law);
the broadening of the concept of criminal attempt, subject to the
introduction of a defense of voluntary renunciation; the limitation of
criminal conspiracy to cases where the object is commission of a
criminal offense and the introduction there as well of a defense of
voluntary renunciation.
In net effect, I submit that these formulations arid reformulations
relate liability to culpability more fairly and precisely than the
antecedent law. That is in my book a significant advance.
IV
I have spoken at such length about the general provisions because
they are the most distinctive innovation of the new codes but there is
much of interest in the special parts as well, to which a brief allusion
should be made.
The treatment of homicide has been reworked in most of the
revisions, employing.the three categories of murder, manslaughter
and negligent homicide, with murder often differentiated into two
degrees. As to the scope of criminality, the most important change is
the abandonment in many jurisdictions of the rule that any death
causally attributable to an otherwise unlawful act is at least manslaughter and the narrowing, or in a few cases the elimination, of
felony murder. 'With respect to the grading of criminalihomicide, the
most important change is the extensive abandonment of deliberation
and premeditation as determinants of gravity in favor of a broad
criterion for reducing an intentional homicide from murder to manslaughter if it is committed "under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse," judging the matter "from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be."
The further complications in states striving to maintain a capital
sanction in the face of shifting constitutional adjudication would
demand another lecture to describe.
~ isxv-Wude -asup
tenzw~
I shxauld a&dd th-a mmst af #,he~
tary provision of the Model Code defining an offense of "reckless
endangering", committed if a person "recklessly engages in conduct
which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury." This generalization, with the definition of
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recklessness carrying the main burden of its content, suffices typically
to supplant a multitude of more particular enactments addressed to
particular types of conduct or particular risks, with the inevitable
gaps that they entail.
In the area of sex offenses, some twenty of our jurisdictions have
thus far followed the example of the Model Code in excluding
private consensual conduct from the scope of criminality, unless
children are victimized or there is coercion or other imposition.
Many jurisdictions had, moreover, greatly relaxed the condemnation
of abortion, though only Hawaii and New York had gone as far in
this regard as Britain in the Act of 1967, before we all discovered that
a course that we thought wise in point of policy was a constitutional
imperative.
Finally, I do not hesitate to say that even in the most familiar
areas, rape, kidnapping, arson, property destruction, burglary,
robbery, extortion, theft and criminal fraud, a study of the codes will
demonstrate how large an opportunity obtained for disciplined
reformulation, reducing abusive overkill, eliminating wild proliferation by simple consolidation, filling gaps that had developed through
the years, and reconsidering distinctions, especially between the
major crimes and minor criminality. It is modest judgment to aver
that great improvements have been made.
V
I have reserved for last a comment on the way the codes have dealt
with the most difficult and most intractable of all the problems of this
field, the sentencing and treatment of offenders.
The Model Penal Code had recognized how totally anarchical our
legislation was in every one of ourjurisdictions in its prescriptions as
to sentence, especially the length of prison terms that might be
imposed upon conviction, the availability and size of fines, the
permissibility of dispositions that do not involve detention, like
probation or suspension or conditional discharge, the determinants of
eligibility for release before the expiration of a prison term, either
because of earned reductions or upon parole.
The anarchy was most extreme in relation to prison terms where it
was not uncommon for the statutes to employ more than a dozen
different minima and maxima, mandatory or permissive, attached in
each case to the provision that defined the crime. The Code offered a
remedy upon this point that proved quite workable in drafting,
namely, to establish for the purposes of sentence a small number of
categories to one of which every offense or degree of offense would be
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assigned, with the nature of the disposition authorized the same for
each offense within the category. The draftsmen of the Model
thought that three degrees of felony, with maximum prison terms of
life, ten years and five were all that were required for the serious
offenses, with one year and thirty days for lesser crimes, misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors. 8
The choice of three and two involved, of course, an element of
arbitrary judgment. The crucial point was to confine the variation
within reasonable bounds.
Almost all of the new codes employed this plan in drafting, though
they differed markedly as to the number of the sentencing categories
employed. New York, for example, used five classes for the serious
offenses rather than three, primarily I think for added scope in plea
bargaining, but the result was not unsuitable in my opinion.
There was, however, some acceptance of other positions of the
Model Code, such as that judicial discretion to forego a sentence of
imprisonment should be unfettered except, perhaps, in murder; that
minimum prison sentences should not be mandated by statute but
should rather be discretionary with the court, so long as a substantial
spread between the minimum and maximum obtains; that all releases
ought to be upon parole; that criteria should be developed and
enacted calling on the courts to forego sentence of imprisonment
unless it is adjudged essential in a given case for a reason that the
Code declares to be sufficient, including to avoid depreciation of the
offender's crime; and that parole criteria should call for release when
eligibility had been attained unless retention is believed to be essential
for a reason that the Code declares to be sufficient, including that
release at that time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime.
I say that there was some acceptance of these positions and would
have asserted with some confidence ten years ago that the acceptance
would increase. I make no such prediction now. The protest against
disparity in sentences, the miserable state of most of our penal
institutions, the growth in the incidence of violent crime, the revolt
against the paternalism inherent in the rehabilitative goal, the resurgence of retributive emotions clothed in philosophical pretensions
have produced counter-forces in our culture the ultimate results of
which are unforeseeable in my opinion. Certain it is that a number of
our jurisdictions have moved backwards towards determinate sentences with a large element of legislative mandate; that parole has been
8. See generally Wechsler, "Sentencing, Correction and the Model Penal Code" (1961),
109 U. Pa. L Rev. 465.
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abolished in some jurisdictions and now struggles to survive; that
individualization, with all the benevolence that it implies, is charged
to be tyrannical. Meanwhile, prison sentences grow longer, the prison population rises and resources for its maintenance decline!
I view none of this with equanimity but I expect the pendulum to
swing again in a more hopeful direction. I envy those of you who are
still young enough to witness this revival when it comes.
Appendix
Status of Substantive PenalLaw Revisiont
I. Revised Codes; Effective Dates: (38)
* Ala. Code tit. 13A (1978 Special Pamphlet: Criminal Code);
1/1/1980.
* Alas. Stat. tit.
11 (Oct.1978 Pamphlet); I/1/1980.
Am. Samoa Code tit.
15 (1979 Cum. Pocket Supp.); 1/1/1980.
* Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 (1978); 10/1/1978.
* Ark. Stat. Ann. tit. 41 (1977 Replacement Vol. 4); 1/1/1976.
* Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 (1978 Replacement Vol. 8); 7/1/1972.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. tit. 53a (West 1972); 10/1/1971.
* Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 (1979 Replacement Vol. 7); 7/1/1973.
Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 44 (West 1976); 7/1/1975.
* Ga. Code Ann. tit.
26 (1978); 7/1/1969.
* Haw. Rev. Stat. tit. 37 (1976 Replacement Vol. 7A); I/1/1973.
* Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972); 1/1/1962.
Ill. Unified Code of Corrections, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1001-1-1
(Smith-Hurd 1973); 1/1/1973.
* Ind.Code Ann. tit. 35 (Bums, 1979 Replacement Volume); 10/1/1977.
Iowa Code Ann. tit. 35 (Criminal Code), tit. 37 (Corrections Code)
(West 1979); 1/1/1978.
* Kan. Stat. Ann. ch. 21 (1974); 7/1/1970.
* Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. chs. 500-534 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1975 Replacement
Vol. 16); 1/1/1975.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 (West 1974); 1942.
* Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A (1981 Pamphlet); 5/1/1976.
Minn. Stat. Ann. ch. 609 (West 1964); 9/1/1963.
* Mo. Ann. Stat. tit. 38 (Vernon 1979); 1/1/ 1979.
* Mont. Code Ann. tit. 45 (1981); 1/1/1974.
Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 28 (1979 Reissue of Vol. 2A); 1/1/1979.
* N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 62 (1974); 11/1/1973.
* N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 2C (West, 1981 Special Pamphlet); 9/1/1979.
f as of April 1982(54jurisdictions). This chart was prepared and is maintained by Rhoda
Lee Bauch, The American Law Institute, 435 W. 116 St., New York City 10027.
* indicates publication of substantial commentary
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N.M. Stat. Ann. ch. 30 (1978); 7/1/1963.
N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney 1975); 9/1/1967.
N.D. Cent. Code tit. 12.1 (1976 Replacement Vol. 2); 7/1/1975.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. tit. 29 (Baldwin, Oct. 1979 Replacement Unit);
11/1974.
Ore. Rev. Stat. tit. 16 (1977 Replacement Part); I/1/1972.
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 (Purdon 1973); 6/6/1973.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33 (1980 Cum. Pocket Supp.); 1/22/1975.
S.D. Codified Laws tit. 22 (1979 Revision); 4/1/1977.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. (Vernon 1974); 1/1/1974.
Utah Code Ann. tit. 76 (1978 Replacement Vol. 8B); 7/1/1973.
Va. Code tit. 18.2 (1975 Replacement Vol. 4); 10/1/1975.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. tit. 9A (1977); 7/1/1976.
Wis. Stat. Ann. tit. 45 (West 1958); 7/1/1956.
Wyo. Criminal Code of 1982, ch. 75, 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws -;
7/1/1983.

1. Current Substantive Penal Code Revision Projects:
A. Revision Completed; Not Yet Enacted: (5)
* District of Columbia (Basic Criminal Code being reviewed by Council of the District of Columbia)
* Massachusetts (Special Legislative Committee preparing new bills)
* Michigan (Second Revised Criminal Code, H.B. 4842, introduced
9/18/1979, under study by Joint Senate/House Committee)
* United States (S. 1630, 97th Cong., reported with amendments by
Senate Judiciary Committee 1/25/1982; H.R. 6915 reported favorably in 96th Cong. by House Judiciary Committee reintroduced in
97th Cong. as H.R. 1647 and referred to House Judiciary Committee)
* West Virginia (Proposed Code, printed in bill form with commentary, being studied by full Judiciary Committees of Senate and
House; Hearings to be held prior to introduction in 1983 Legislature)
B. Revision Under Way: (2)
* North Carolina, South Carolina (second effort)
C. ContemplatingRevision: (2)
Mississsippi, Rhode Island
III. Revision Completed but Abortive: (6)
* California (S.B. 27 not reported out of Assembly Committee on
Criminal Justice in 1977)
Idaho (Idaho Penal & Correctional Code tit. 18, enacted effective
1/111972 but repealed effective 4/111972)
* Maryland (Partial enactments: responsibility; theft and related
offenses. Further submission suspended.)
* indicates publication of substantial commentary
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Oklahoma (S.B. 46 not reported out of Senate Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence in 1977)
* Tennessee (S.B. 600 reported in 1977 to have failed in Committee)
* Vermont (Bill passed by House as amended; reported in 1976 to have
failed in Senate Judiciary Committee)
IV. No Over-All Revision Planned:(1)
Nevada (recodification with minor changes enacted 1967)
* indicates publication of substantial commentary

